He who knows the Self to be indestructible, free of the last modification, eternal, free of transformation, unborn, free of birth, imperishable, free of decline, as the earlier verse described: how can that man, learned and qualified, slay, perform the act of slaying, or cause another to slay, set a slayer to work? In no way does he slay anyone, in no way cause anyone to slay. The force of the question, in both cases, is a denial, since a question in the literal sense is not possible here; and since the reason, changelessness, is the same in both cases, the meaning the Blessed Lord intends in this topic is the denial of all action for the knower. The denial in the form 'how can he slay' is stated by way of an example. Seeing what special reason for the impossibility of action in the knower does the Blessed Lord deny actions of him? It has already been said that the changelessness of the Self is the special cause of the impossibility of all action. True; but that is not a cause special to the knower, since the changeless Self is other than the knower. If it be said that action is not impossible for one who has merely known a changeless post, the answer is no: because the knower is the Self. The aggregate of body and the rest is not what has knowledge; therefore, by elimination, the unconjoined, changeless Self is the knower, and so the denial of action of that knower, 'how can that man', is right. Just as the changeless Self is, through want of discernment between itself and the workings of the intellect, by ignorance imagined to be the apprehender of objects like sound brought to it by the intellect, so the changeless Self is, through the workings of the intellect by a knowledge not real in the highest sense, called the knower. From the statement of the impossibility of action for the knower, it is understood that the Blessed Lord's settled view is that the actions enjoined by scripture are enjoined for the ignorant, not for the knower. Now, knowledge too is enjoined only for the ignorant, since for one who already has it the enjoining of knowledge is as useless as grinding what is ground; so the distinction, that actions are for the ignorant and not for the knower, does not hold. The answer is no: because a distinction in what is to be done, as present or absent, is tenable. For an ignorant man with the cognition 'I am the doer, this is to be done by me', after the knowledge of the meaning of an injunction such as the fire-oblation, the rite is something to be done, to be carried out with its many means. But it is not so that, after the knowledge of the meaning of an injunction about the true nature of the Self, 'it is not born' and the rest, anything remains to be done; rather, from the knowledge whose object is the oneness and non-doership of the Self, 'I am not the doer, I am not the enjoyer', no other cognition arises. This is the distinction that holds. He who knows the Self as 'I am the doer' will inevitably have the cognition 'this is to be done by me'; with regard to that he is qualified, and toward him actions are possible. And he is ignorant; for the knower has been marked off by 'those two do not know' and by the denial of action of the qualified knower in 'how can that man'. Therefore, for the knower marked off as one who sees the changeless Self, and for the seeker of liberation, the authority is for the renunciation of all action alone. For this very reason the Blessed Lord Nārāyaṇa, distinguishing the Sāṅkhyas, the knowers, from the ignorant doers of action, has them take up two steadfastnesses: 'by the path of knowledge for the Sāṅkhyas, by the path of action for the yogins'. So too the Blessed Lord Vyāsa said to his son, 'these are the two paths' and the rest, and 'the path of action is first, and renunciation after'. The Blessed Lord will show this same division again and again: 'one of untrue knowledge, his self deluded by the sense of I, thinks I am the doer; but the knower of the truth thinks I do not act'; and 'renouncing all actions by the mind, he sits at ease' and the rest. Here some who think themselves learned say that no one ever gains the knowledge 'I, the one Self, am free of the six modifications of being beginning with birth, changeless, no doer', upon which the renunciation of all action could be taught. This is wrong, because it would make the teaching of scripture, 'it is not born' and the rest, purposeless. They should be asked: just as, by the power of the teaching of scripture, the knowledge of the existence of merit and demerit and the knowledge of the doer's connection with another body arise, why should the knowledge of that same Self's changelessness, non-doership and oneness not arise from scripture? If it be said that the Self is not within reach of the instruments, the answer is no: because of the scripture 'it is to be seen by the mind alone'. The mind, refined by the teaching of scripture and teacher and by calm, restraint and the rest, is the instrument in the seeing of the Self; and so to say that, when inference and scripture are present for the reaching of it, knowledge does not arise, is mere recklessness. And knowledge, once arising, must necessarily set aside its opposite, ignorance; this must be granted. That ignorance has been shown: 'I am the slayer', 'I am slain', and 'those two do not know'. There the doership, the objecthood and the causing-of-a-doer of the Self with regard to the act of slaying were shown to be made by ignorance; and that doership and the rest, being made by ignorance, is the same in all actions, since the Self is changeless. For only one who has modification, a doer, sets another, the object, to work, saying 'do'. The Blessed Lord Vāsudeva denies, without distinction, the knower's doership and causing-of-a-doer in all actions, in order to show that the knower has no authority for action, by 'know the indestructible ... how can that man' and the rest. And where, then, is the knower's authority? That has been said: 'by the path of knowledge for the Sāṅkhyas'. So too He will state the renunciation of all action: 'renouncing all actions by the mind' and the rest. From the word 'by the mind' it might be thought there is no renunciation of the actions of speech and body. No: because of the qualification 'all actions'. If it be said that only all the mental actions are meant, the answer is no: because the actions of speech and body are preceded by the action of the mind, and untenable in its absence. If it be said that one should renounce by the mind all actions other than the mental actions that cause the scriptural actions of speech and body, the answer is no: because of the qualification 'neither acting nor causing to act'. If it be said that this renunciation of all action is stated for one about to die, not for one living, the answer is no: because the qualification 'the embodied one sits in the city of nine gates' is then untenable, for one dead by the renunciation of all action cannot sit in that body. If it be said the connection is 'having renounced in the body, while not acting and not causing to act', and not 'sits in the body', the answer is no: because the changelessness of the Self is everywhere affirmed, and because the act of sitting depends on a locus while renunciation does not; the word 'nyāsa' with the prefix 'sam' here means abandonment, not depositing. Therefore, in the scripture of the Gītā, for one who has the knowledge of the Self the authority is for renunciation alone, not for action; this we shall show, here and there below, in the topic of the knowledge of the Self. Let us state the matter in hand. There the indestructibility of the Self was laid down. Like what, it is asked.

The man who knows this self to be eternal in this way, by its indestructibility, its being unborn, and its not being liable to wasting away, that man, among selves abiding in the bodies of gods, men, animals, and unmoving things, how does he cause any self to be slain, or how does he slay, how destroy, or how become the instigator of it? The grieving 'I cause these selves to be slain, I slay them' has its very root in not knowing the truth of the self's nature. Though for the eternal selves only a separation from the body is brought about, still, when the bodies that are the means of delightful enjoyments perish, there is indeed an occasion for grief, the parting from them. So to this the Lord speaks.

Therefore, how should one who knows the self in this way cause anyone to be slain, or slay anyone? 'The indestructible' is that which is free of destruction from any occasioning cause; 'the eternal' is that which is free of destruction by its own nature. Or else 'the indestructible' is that which is free of any taint of fault, and 'the eternal' is that which always exists. This distinction holds throughout, since the word 'perished' is used of persons and the like that are tainted with fault.