Of the unreal, of what does not exist, namely cold, heat and the rest together with their causes, there is no being, no coming-to-be, no existence. For cold, heat and the rest, with their causes, when examined by the means of knowledge, do not stand as a real thing: each is a modification, and a modification strays from itself. As the shape of a pot, examined by the eye, is found to be nothing apart from clay and so is unreal, so every modification, found to be nothing apart from its cause, is unreal. The effect, a pot, is not found before its birth or after its destruction, and the cause too, clay, is not found apart from its own cause; so it is unreal. If it be objected that this entails the unreality of everything, the answer is no: because everywhere two cognitions are had, a cognition of being and a cognition of a particular thing. That with regard to which the cognition does not stray is real; that with regard to which it strays is unreal. The division of real and unreal resting on cognition, everywhere two cognitions are had by everyone, of one and the same locus, not as in 'a blue lotus' where the two are of different things: 'the pot is', 'the cloth is', 'the elephant is', and so everywhere. Of these two, the cognition of pot and the rest strays, as shown; the cognition of being does not. Therefore the object of the cognition of pot is unreal, since it strays, and the object of the cognition of being is not, since it does not stray. If it be said that when the pot is destroyed and the cognition of pot strays, the cognition of being too strays, the answer is no: because the cognition of being is still had with cloth and the rest; that cognition of being has the qualified thing for its object. If it be said that the cognition of pot too, like the cognition of being, is had with another pot, the answer is no: because it is not had with cloth and the like. If it be said that the cognition of being too is not had once the pot is destroyed, the answer is no: because the qualified thing is then absent; the cognition of being, having the qualified thing for its object, can in the absence of the qualified thing have no object, since a qualifier without a qualified is untenable, but it is not that it has no object of its own. If it be said that being of one locus is not right in the absence of the qualified thing, the answer is no: because, as in 'this is water' said of a mirage, sameness of locus is seen even when one of the two is absent. Therefore of the unreal, the body and the pairs of opposites with their causes, there is no being; and of the real, the Self, there is no non-being, since everywhere it does not stray, as we have said. Thus the conclusion regarding both, the Self and the not-Self, the real and the unreal, has been settled by the seers of the truth: the real is just real, the unreal just unreal. 'Tat' is a pronoun, and Brahman, the all, is named 'tat'; the state of being that is 'tattva', the true nature of Brahman; those whose habit it is to see that are the seers of the truth. You too, taking your stand on the vision of the seers of the truth, casting off sorrow and delusion, settling in your mind that cold, heat and the rest, the pairs of opposites of fixed and of varying form, are a modification that, being unreal, appears falsely like the water of a mirage, endure them. That is the intent. What then is that which is said to be ever real?
Contemporary English rendering of the Sanskrit bhāṣya, pending scholar review.