Know the knower of the field, of the character described, to be also Me, the supreme Lord, not in transmigration. The knower of the field, who in all fields stands divided by the adjuncts of many fields, from Brahmā down to a clump of grass: know Him as that knower with all the distinctions of adjunct set aside, beyond the reach of word and notion such as 'real' and 'unreal'. Since, apart from the true nature of field, field-knower and Lord, nothing else remains as an object of knowledge, the knowledge by which the field and the field-knower, the things to be known, are made objects, that knowledge is right knowledge: such is the view of Me, the Lord Viṣṇu. Now it may be objected: if in all fields there is one Lord alone, and no other enjoyer distinct from Him, then either the Lord comes to be in transmigration; or else, since there is no transmigrant other than the Lord, transmigration is absent. Both are unwanted: the scripture of bondage, liberation and their causes would be purposeless, and there is conflict with perception and the other means of knowledge. By perception transmigration, marked by pleasure, pain and their causes, is grasped; and from the variety of the world transmigration, caused by merit and demerit, is inferred. All this is untenable if the Self and the Lord are one. This is no fault, because it is tenable through the difference of knowledge and ignorance. 'Far apart, contrary, divergent, are these two, what is known as ignorance and what is known as knowledge' (Kaṭha 1.2.4). And the difference of their fruits too is stated as contrary, 'the better and the pleasanter', the better being the object of knowledge, the pleasanter being the effect of ignorance. So too Vyāsa: 'now these are the two paths' (Mahābhārata, Śānti 241.6) and 'just these two paths'. And here two steadfastnesses have been stated. That ignorance, together with its effect, is to be abandoned is understood from scripture, remembered text and reasoning. The scriptures: 'if one has known here, then there is truth; if one has not known here, great is the destruction' (Kena 2.5), 'knowing Him thus, one becomes deathless here' (Nṛsiṃha-pūrva-tāpinī 6), 'no other path is there for the going' (Śvetāśvatara 3.8), 'the knower fears nothing whatever' (Taittirīya 2.4); and for the ignorant, 'then fear comes to him' (Taittirīya 2.7), 'dwelling in the midst of ignorance' (Kaṭha 1.2.5), 'who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself' (Muṇḍaka 3.2.9), 'whoever worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he himself another, does not know; he is like an animal for the gods; but the knower of the Self, he becomes all this' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 1.4.10), 'when, like a hide' (Śvetāśvatara 6.20), and a thousand such. And the remembered texts: 'knowledge is veiled by ignorance, and thereby creatures are deluded' (Gītā 5.15), 'here itself the round of birth is conquered by those whose mind is set in evenness' (Gītā 5.19), 'seeing the same everywhere' (Gītā 13.28) and the like. And by reasoning: 'knowing them to be snakes, blades of kuśa-grass, or a well, men avoid them; some, through ignorance, fall into them; see, then, how distinguished is the fruit of knowledge' (Mahābhārata, Śānti 201.16). So it is understood that the ignorant man, who takes the body and the rest for the Self, driven by passion, aversion and the rest, doing merit and demerit, is born and dies; while those who see the Self as distinct from the body and the rest, by the stilling of the engagement in merit and demerit that depends on the casting-off of passion, aversion and the rest, are liberated. This no one can deny by reasoning. That being so, the field-knower, which is the very Lord, comes to seem as if in transmigration through the difference of adjuncts made by ignorance, just as the Self comes to seem the body and the rest. For in all creatures there is a settled sense of self in the not-self, the body and the rest, made by ignorance, like the settled cognition of a man in a post; and yet the qualities of the man do not thereby belong to the post, nor the post's qualities to the man. Just so, consciousness is not a quality of the body, nor are the body's qualities, pleasure, pain, delusion and the like, fittingly qualities of the Self, since they are equally made by ignorance, like old age and death. It may be objected that the illustration is not parallel: the post and the man are both things to be known, mutually superimposed on each other by ignorance by a knower, whereas with the body and the Self the mutual superimposition is of the known and the knower; so the illustration is not the same, and therefore a quality of the body, though known, does belong to the knower, the Self. No: for that would entail unconsciousness and the like. If the qualities of the field, the body and the rest, the thing to be known, pleasure, pain, delusion, desire and the rest, belonged to the knower, then a special reason must be told why some qualities of the field belong to the Self, superimposed by ignorance, while old age, death and the rest do not. And there is an inference that they do not: because they are superimposed by ignorance, like old age and death; because they are to be abandoned; because they are to be taken up, and so on. So transmigration, marked as doership and enjoyership, lodged in the known, is superimposed by ignorance on the knower; and the knower is in no way harmed by it, just as space is not harmed by the surface-dirt and the like superimposed on it by children. As for the objection that the illustration is not parallel, it is wrong. Only the bare superimposition by ignorance is what is meant as the common feature of illustration and thing illustrated, and that does not stray. And what you suppose strays in the knower, that too has been shown to be inconclusive, by the case of old age and the rest. It may be objected that the field-knower is in transmigration because it possesses ignorance. No, because ignorance is of the nature of darkness. Ignorance is a cognition of the nature of darkness, since it is of the nature of veiling; it is a grasper of the contrary, or a producer of doubt, or of the nature of non-grasping, since in the presence of the light of discernment it is absent, and since the three kinds of ignorance, non-grasping and the rest, are observed when the darkness-natured fault of the veiling kind, dimness of sight and the like, is present. Then, it is said, ignorance is a quality of the knower. No, because the fault of dimness of sight and the like is observed in the instrument, the eye. What you suppose, that ignorance is a quality of the knower, and that this very possession of the quality of ignorance is the transmigrant state of the field-knower, and that therefore what was said, that the field-knower is the very Lord and not a transmigrant, is wrong: that is not so. For the fault of contrary grasping and the like is seen in the instrument, the eye; the contrary grasping, and the dimness of sight that occasions it, is not a quality of the grasper, since, when by treatment the dimness is removed from the eye, the contrary grasping is no longer seen in the grasper. Just so, everywhere, the cognitions of non-grasping, of the contrary, and of doubt, and their occasions, can belong only to some instrument, not to the knower, the field-knower. And because they are objects of awareness, like the light of a lamp, they cannot be qualities of the knower; being objects of awareness, they are objects known by something other than one's own Self. And in aloneness, when there is parting from all instruments, no possession of fault such as ignorance is granted by any disputant. If ignorance were the field-knower's own quality, like heat in fire, then there could never be a parting from it; and since the Self, being changeless, all-pervading like space, and formless, can have no joining or parting with anything, it is established that the field-knower is ever the Lord, as the Lord's own words show, 'because it is beginningless and free of qualities' (Gītā 13.31). Now it may be objected that, with the absence of transmigration and the transmigrant state, the fault of scripture's purposelessness and the rest would follow. No, because that is accepted by all. A fault accepted by all the holders of doctrines about the Self is not to be removed by one alone. How is it accepted? The absence of the dealings of transmigration and the transmigrant state for the liberated souls is held by all the holders of doctrines about the Self, and for them no fault of scripture's purposelessness is accepted as following. Just so for us: with the oneness of the field-knowers and the Lord, let scripture be purposeless there, and have its purpose in the sphere of ignorance, just as for all the dualists scripture has its purpose only in the state of bondage, not in the state of liberation. It may be urged: for all dualists the states of bondage and liberation of the Self are real things in the supreme sense, so, since the things to be abandoned and taken up and their means exist, scripture has its purpose; but for the non-dualists, since duality is unreal, made by ignorance, and the state of bondage of the Self is unreal, scripture is without an object and purposeless. No, because a difference of states for the Self is untenable. If the states of bondage and liberation belonged to the Self, they would be either at once or in sequence. Not at once, for they are contrary and cannot coexist in one thing, like rest and motion. If in sequence, then, without a cause, there would be no release ever; and with another for cause, since it would not be of itself, it would be unreal, and so the doctrine collapses. Further, in determining the before and after of the two states, the state of bondage must be supposed first, beginningless yet having an end, which is against the means of knowledge; and the state of liberation would have a beginning and be endless, also against the means of knowledge. And one who, having states, passes to another state cannot be shown to be eternal. If, to avoid the fault of impermanence, no difference of the states of bondage and liberation is supposed, then for the dualists too the fault of scripture's purposelessness is unavoidable; being common, it is not a fault the non-dualist alone must remove. And there is no purposelessness of scripture, since scripture has for its sphere the ignorant man as commonly recognised. The seeing of the Self in the not-self, in the fruit and the means, belongs to the ignorant, not to the knowers; for the knowers, who see the Self as other than the fruit and the means, cannot have the cognition 'I' in those. Not even one utterly deluded, a madman and the like, sees the oneness of water and fire, or of shade and light; how much less the discerning man. Therefore the scripture of injunction and prohibition does not bear on one who sees the Self as other than the fruit and the means. When one is set to some action with 'Devadatta, do this', Viṣṇumitra, standing by and hearing the command, does not take it that 'I am the one set to it'; but where the discernment of distinctness is not grasped, the taking-up is tenable, and so too with the fruit and the means. It may be urged that, even when one sees the Self as other than the fruit and the means, the grasp of the scripture's matter is fitting by virtue of the natural connection, as 'I am set to the means of the desired fruit, turned back from the means of the undesired', just as fathers and sons, though they see each other's selves as distinct, grasp the meaning of mutual command and prohibition. No, because the conceit of being the self in the fruit and the means is already established before the cognition of the distinct Self arises. For it is one who has grasped the meaning of command and prohibition that comes to know the Self as other than the fruit and the means, not before. Therefore it is established that the scripture of injunction and prohibition bears on the ignorant. It may be objected that, in 'one who desires heaven should sacrifice', 'he should not eat kalañja' and the like, since those who see the difference of the Self do not engage, and those who see only the body as the Self are, on this view, no real doers, scripture is purposeless. No, because engagement and turning-away are tenable from the recognition as it stands. The knower of Brahman, who sees the oneness of the Lord and the field-knower, does not engage; likewise the holder of the no-self doctrine, holding 'there is no other world', does not engage. But one who, by the otherwise-untenability of hearing the scripture of injunction and prohibition, has inferred the existence of the Self, who does not know the particulars of the Self, who has craving for the fruit of action and is full of faith, does engage as the matter stands recognised. The right vision is not present to all; so scripture is not purposeless. It may be urged that, since the discerning do not engage, and their followers, following them, do not engage, scripture is purposeless. No, because discernment arises in only some one. Among many creatures only some one is discerning, as now; and the deluded do not follow the discerning, since their engagement is governed by faults such as passion, and engagement in sorcery and the like is seen, and engagement is by nature, as it was said 'nature engages' (Gītā 5.14). Therefore transmigration is mere ignorance, having for its sphere only what is seen; ignorance and its effect do not belong to the field-knower taken alone. And false knowledge cannot harm the real thing in the supreme sense. Mirage-water cannot turn a salt-marsh to mud with its moisture; just so ignorance can do nothing whatever to the field-knower. And so it was said, 'know the field-knower as Me' (Gītā 13.2), and 'knowledge is veiled by ignorance' (Gītā 5.15). But what then is this, that even the learned, like those in transmigration, have the notion 'I am thus' and 'this is mine'? Hear: this is their learning, that they see the Self in the field alone. If they were to see the field-knower as changeless, they would not long for enjoyment or action, thinking 'this would be mine'; for enjoyment and action are themselves modification. This being so, the ignorant, from his desire for fruit, engages; for the knower, the seer of the changeless Self, since the desire for fruit is absent and engagement is untenable, turning-away is figuratively spoken of, when the activity of the aggregate of effect and instrument has ceased. And let this other be the learning of some: the field-knower is the Lord alone; the field is other, the object of the field-knower; but I am a transmigrant, happy and unhappy; and the ending of my transmigration is to be done by me, by the knowledge of field and field-knower, and, by meditation, having made the Lord, the field-knower, present to me, by abiding in His true nature. And he who thinks so, and he who teaches so, is not the field-knower. Whoever holds this is the basest of the learned; thinking 'I give a purpose to transmigration, to liberation and to scripture', he is a slayer of the Self, himself deluded, and he deludes others, being without the tradition of the scripture's meaning, abandoning what scripture says and inventing what it does not. Therefore one who does not know the tradition, even though he knows all scriptures, is to be passed over like a fool. As for what was said, that if the Lord and the field-knower are one the Lord becomes a transmigrant, and that if the field-knowers and the Lord are one then, since there is no transmigrant, transmigration is absent: both faults have been answered by the acceptance of the difference of knowledge and ignorance. A real thing in the supreme sense is not harmed by a fault imagined by ignorance with regard to it; and the illustration was shown, that a salt-marsh is not turned to mud by mirage-water. And the fault that with the absence of a transmigrant transmigration is absent has also been answered, by the tenability of transmigration and the transmigrant being imagined by ignorance. It may be objected that the very possession of ignorance is the field-knower's transmigrant fault, and that the happiness and unhappiness it makes are perceived directly. No, because that, being a quality of the known field, the fault it makes is untenable in the knower, the field-knower. Whatever array of faults you fasten onto the field-knower, that, being itself non-existent in it, since it is something to be known, is thereby a quality of the field, not a quality of the field-knower; and the field-knower is not harmed by it, since the joining of the known with the knower is untenable. If there were such a joining, the very state of being known would be untenable. And if the possession of ignorance and the state of being unhappy and the rest were a quality of the Self, how, then, are they perceived directly, and how are they a quality of the field-knower? When it is settled that all that is known is the field and that the knower alone is the field-knower, then to say that ignorance, the state of being unhappy and the rest are qualifications of the field-knower, qualities of it, and yet are perceived directly, is to say what is contradictory, holding to ignorance alone. Here it is asked: whose, then, is this ignorance? It is of him for whom it is seen. And of whom is it seen? The question 'whose is ignorance seen to be' is purposeless. If ignorance is seen, you see along with it the one who has it; and when the one who has it is perceived, the question 'whose is it' is not fitting. When a possessor of cattle is perceived, the question 'whose are the cattle' has no purpose. The illustration, it is said, is uneven: cattle and their owner are both perceptible, so their connection too is perceptible, and the question is purposeless; but ignorance and the one who has it are not perceptible, so the question is not purposeless. The answer: when, by an imperceptible possessor of ignorance, the connection with ignorance is known, what is it to you? Since ignorance is the cause of harm, it should be set aside; the one whose ignorance it is will set it aside. The ignorance, it is said, is mine alone. Then you know ignorance and the Self that has it. I know it, but not by perception. If you know it by inference, how is the connection grasped? For at that time the connection of you the knower with ignorance, the thing to be known, cannot be grasped, since ignorance is fit only to be the knower's object; and there cannot be another knowledge having that connection of knower and ignorance for its object, since that would entail an endless regress: if the connection of knower and known were itself known by a knower, another knower would have to be supposed, and another for him, and another for him, an endless regress unavoidable. But if ignorance is something known, or anything else is known, it is just the known; and likewise the knower is just the knower, not something known. This being so, the field-knower, the knower, is in no way harmed by ignorance, the state of being unhappy and the rest. It may be objected that this is the very fault, the being a knower of a faulty field. No; the state of being a knower is figuratively spoken of for what is in its nature mere consciousness, changeless, just as the act of heating is figuratively spoken of for fire by reason of its mere heat. Just as here the Blessed Lord shows, of Himself, the absence of any nature as act, factor and fruit in the Self, and that act, factor and the rest are figuratively spoken of in the Self only by superimposition through ignorance, so He has shown it here and there, in such topics as 'he who knows this to be the slayer' (Gītā 2.19), 'the actions are wholly done by the qualities of Nature' (Gītā 3.27), 'He takes on no one's sin' (Gītā 5.15); and so we have explained it, and in the later topics we shall show it. It then follows that, since the Self has of itself no nature as act, factor and fruit, and these are superimposed by ignorance, actions are to be done only by the ignorant, not by the knowers. True, so it follows; and this very thing we shall show at 'for it is not possible for an embodied one' (Gītā 18.11), and particularly in the topic that sums up the meaning of the whole scripture, at 'in brief, O son of Kuntī, the supreme steadfastness of knowledge' (Gītā 18.50). Enough here of much elaboration. This verse, 'that field, and what it is' (Gītā 13.3), is set down as a verse summing up the matter of the chapter on the field, taught in the verses beginning 'this body' (Gītā 13.1); for the setting-down of a summary of a matter one wishes to explain is the right course.
Contemporary English rendering of the Sanskrit bhāṣya, pending scholar review.